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ABSTRACT 
 
Several years after the inception of the most dominant cryptocurrency, bitcoin, 
the European Central Bank in 2015 indicated the need for establishing legal 
clarity by relevant authorities through explaining how the current legal 
framework applies to cryptocurrencies. Three years later, no meaningful step 
has been taken by any of the European Union (EU) institutions including the 
parliament. By examining the EU’s legal framework governing payments 
services, including the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) Regulation, the 
Electronic Money Directive, the Payment Services Directive and the proposed 
AML/CTF Directive, this article concludes that (a) because the existing 
payment services laws apply to payments effected in currencies (legal tenders) 
and cryptocurrencies are not defined as currencies under the EU law or the laws 
of member states, they do not cover cryptocurrencies. It also argues that it is 
impossible to design sui generis payments services law for cryptocurrencies 
without curbing their essential features, especially decentralization. Lastly, the 
article proposes centralization and the creation of state cryptocurrency as 
possible solutions moving forward and examines their strengths and challenges.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Not long ago, it was acceptable to define a cryptocurrency as digital 
peer-to-peer currency created by cryptography1. But such a definition is no 
longer universally valid because despite the fact that the term currency appears 
in cryptocurrency, there is a strong argument that a cryptocurrency is not a 
currency2 and today there are new kinds of tokens that indeed qualify clearly as 
security3, hence negating the notion that cryptocurrencies are peer-to–peer 
currencies, or at least casting doubt on it. 
A further explanation of cryptocurrencies is likely to state that unlike 
traditional currencies issued by the central banks, a cryptocurrency has no 
central authority that controls its creation and circulation.4 Yet, the New 
Generation Cryptocurrencies (NGCs) created by initial coin offering provide 
counter-examples to the narrative of lack of central authority running a 
cryptocurrency5. Some of the NGCs are fairly centralized and there is an entity 
which has the upper hand in their creation and distribution6. Consequently, if 
there is one lesson to be learnt from the evolution of cryptocurrencies, it is that 
there is nothing constant in the definition of a cryptocurrency. The only constant 
is the fast evolution of cryptocurrencies and businesses centred on them and the 
lack of robust legal framework regulating them in many areas. 
This article singles out the European Union’s payment services law to 
analyse whether tailor-made payment services law for cryptocurrencies could 
be designed. A task of paramount importance for this article is exposing the 
                                                
1 See generally Timothy Bierer, Hashing Out: The Problems and Solutions Concerning 
Cryptocurrency used as Article 9 Collateral, 7 J. OF L., TECH., AND THE INTERNET 79 (2016) 
81; Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology, and the 
Rise of Lex Cryptographia, (March 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664. 
2 Mitchell Prentis, Digital Metal: Regulating Bitcoin as a Commodity, 66 CASE WESTERN L. 
REV. 609 (2015), 626. 
3 See Arjya Majumdar, A Regulatory Outlook on Initial Coin Offerings, OXFORD BUS. L. 
BLOG (Aug 3, 2017), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-
blog/blog/2017/08/regulatory-outlook-initial-coin-offerings.  Hacker & Thomale 
make distinctions between three types of token archetypes, namely, currency, utility and 
investment token and argue that only investment tokens qualify as securities. See also Hacker, 
Philipp and Thomale, Chris, Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and 
Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law (November 22, 2017), p. 43. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3075820 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3075820.  
4 See Matthew Kien-Meng Ly, Coining Bitcoin’s “Legal Bits”: Examining the Legal 
Framework for Bitcoin and Virtual Currencies, 27 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH. 588 (2014) at 590; 
R. Ali, J. Barrdear, R. Clews, and J. Southgate, Innovations in payment technologies and the 
emergence of digital currencies, 54 BANK OF ENG. Q. BULLETIN 262. 
5 Supra note 3. 
6 Id. 
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ideological nature of the debate on the regulation of cryptocurrencies, as a result 
of which many exaggerated claims regarding cryptocurrencies have escaped 
unquestioned in literature dealing with law and technology. The result of this 
uncritical reception of whatever industry experts claim about cryptocurrencies 
and pretending that nothing happened when those claims turned out to be false 
or exaggerated is lack of credibility in intellectual debates and of regulatory 
efforts. 
 One of the narratives that have been advanced is that cryptocurrencies 
would help bank the unbanked.7 This claim has been one of the buzz words that 
have been spreading around, but when the value of the major cryptocurrencies 
became unaffordable, not just to the unbanked but to the middle-income earner8 
and transactions in cryptocurrencies are exceedingly technical and risky, it is 
clear that cryptocurrencies have nothing to do with the unbanked. Just to be 
clear, the so-called unbanked are those who have no access to financial services 
such as credit card or debit card9. The claim that cryptocurrencies would give 
the unbanked access to financial services was clearly bogus from the very outset 
and proven to be false now. But the claim is now buried under more junk news 
reports on the internet and nobody is willing to go to the archives and pull them 
out to ask the industry experts what they were thinking when they made the 
claim. Highlighting on the campaign strategy of early bitcoin developers, 
Former Greek Finance Minister Varoufakis stated: 
 
There is a Bitcoin aristocracy, the Bitcoin early adopters, who 
accumulated very cheaply Bitcoins from the beginning. They 
have every reason to talk this thing up and lure people into like 
a Tulip-like mania or a pyramid, making extravagant claims 
[…] to (open and use a new Bitcoin ATM). This was all just 
hype.10 
 
                                                
7 Paul Vigna and Michael J. Casey, Bitcoin for the Unbanked: Cryptocurrencies That Go 
Where Big Banks Won’t, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Oct. 25, 2017),  
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sponsored/bitcoin-unbanked; Steve Forbes, How Bitcoin Will 
End World Poverty Forbes Magazine, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveforbes/2015/04/02/how-bitcoin-will-end-world-
poverty/#40cb2eb82a5a; George Basiladze, How Cryptocurrencies Can Help Bank the 
Unbanked, FIN. MAGNETS (Aug. 16, 2015), 
https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/bloggers/how-cryptocurrencies-can-help-
bank-the-unbanked/ 
8 It suffices to state that as of January 12, 2018 on Bitsmap (exchange), the rate for bitcoin is 
over 13,000 USD, for Bitcoin Cash is over 2,500 USD, for Ethereum is over 1,000 USD and 
for Ripple is over 2,000 USD. Whether or not this rates fluctuate, increase, or reduce drastically, 
they have already demonstrated that cryptocurrencies have nothing to do with the unbanked. 
9 Eric Sammons, How Cryptocurrencies like Dash Help the Poor, DASH NEWS (Aug 23, 2017), 
https://www.dashforcenews.com/cryptocurrencies-like-dash-help-poor/. 
10 Evan Smart, Bitcoin Debate between Andreas Antonopoulos vs. The Greek Finance Minister, 
CRYTOCOIN NEWS (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/bitcoin-debate-andreas-
antonopoulos-vs-greek-finance-minister/. 
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 These are important issues as they demonstrate that the appropriate 
regulatory policy response for cryptocurrencies must begin with the assumption 
that the cryptocurrency economy is built on a bubble and the early developers 
of cryptocurrencies cannot be trusted to offer responsible policy framework for 
self-regulation. 
 
1. OVERVIEW OF THE CRYPTOCURRENCY SYSTEM 
 
1.1 DEFINING CRYPTOCURRENCIES  
 
 “Cryptocurrency is a system of currency that uses cryptography to allow 
secure transfer and exchange of digital tokens in a distributed and decentralised 
manner.”11 The most dominant cryptocurrency that laid the ground for all 
cryptocurrencies is bitcoin, which was created by a person or a group identified 
pseudonymously as Satoshi Nakamoto12. The white paper of bitcoin defines 
bitcoin as “purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash that allows online 
payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a 
financial institution.”13 The idea of enabling fund transfer to be conducted 
without an intermediary is one of the reasons for the creation of bitcoin and 
subsequent other cryptocurrencies. Similarly, to other cryptocurrencies, bitcoin 
can only be stored on a computer (or a smart phone)14.  
 Cryptocurrencies are created by mining -- solving automatically 
generated mathematical puzzles towards processing transactions of users15. In 
technical terms, “…mining is the competitive process of collecting transactions 
and adding them to the blockchain in the form of blocks.’16 “Blockchain is a 
sequence of blocks, which holds the complete record of transactions (a public 
ledger) indicating the order in which the transactions occurred.”17 
 The total number of bitcoins to be created is limited by the bitcoin 
protocol to 21 Million BTC18, an upper limit that is either different or not 
applicable to most of the other active cryptocurrencies. To encourage miners in 
maintaining the system by taking part in the mining process, 50 bitcoins were 
rewarded initially to a miner that solves the mathematical puzzle, an amount 
that reduces by half quadrennially19. As the mathematical puzzles become more 
                                                
11 Eli Dourado and Jerry Brito, Cryptocurrency, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECON. 
(2014). 
12 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN.ORG (Nov. 1, 
2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
13 Id 
14 Conrad Barski and Chris Wilmer, Bitcoin for the Befuddled, NO SCRATCH PRESS (2015) 1.  
15 Id at 4. 
16 Id at 6.  
17 David Lee Kuo Chuen, Handbook of Digital Currency: Bitcoin, Innovation, financial 
Instruments, and Big Data, ELSEVIER INC. (2015) at 49. 
18 Andreas M. Antonopoulos, MASTERING BITCOIN 2 (Mike Loudikes and Allyson MacDonald, 
1st Ed. 2015). 
19 Id. 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet • Vol. 9 • 2018 
Regulating Decentralized Cryptocurrencies Under Payment Services Law: 
Lessons from European Union Law 
_______________________________________________________________ 
5 
 
difficult and the reward smaller, miners invest more time and resource today in 
mining20. Once all the 21 million bitcoins are created, the exclusive source of 
miners’ income would be transaction fees21. As of September 2017, there are a 
little over 16-million bitcoins in circulation22.  
           
1.2 WHY CRYPTOCURRENCIES? 
 
 Understanding the reasons for the birth of cryptocurrencies gives a 
complete picture of the regulatory problem embodied in them. It also allows 
one to appreciate whether there was a realistic vision for the creation of a system 
of payment or currency. Since the creation of bitcoin coincided with the 2008 
global financial crisis, it is commonly suggested that bitcoin is the result of the 
global financial crisis, although there is no concrete evidence for that23. The 
purpose and the core principles of cryptocurrencies do not address the causes 
or consequences of the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored 
that the lack of trust in government institutions and central banks that ensued 
during and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis might have been 
exploited as a marketing tool by the developers and backers of bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies24. But that remains the only connection between 
cryptocurrencies and the global financial crisis. 
 A strong argument is made that cryptocurrencies have four potential 
advantages relative to cash money and traditional payment services that justify 
their creation, i.e., they are cheap payment methods, trustless, decentralized, 
and pseudonymous25. But most of these attributes are more talking points than 
true attributes that withstand even the slightest scrutiny, as examined in the 
preceding sub-sections. Though these features of decentralized 
cryptocurrencies are frequently discussed in literature, it is necessary to provide 
their overview since they are important in examining the feasibility of 
constructing payment services law for cryptocurrencies. 
 
1.2.1 CHEAP 
 
 Cryptocurrencies are claimed to lower transaction costs because 
transactions such as transfer of funds do not involve third party intermediaries 
                                                
20 Id. 
21 Rainer Böhme et al., Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance, 29 J. OF ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 213, 218.  
22 Bitcoins in circulation, BLOCKCHAIN INFO (Sep. 22, 2017), 
https://blockchain.info/charts/total-bitcoins. 
23 See Yanis Varoufakis, Bitcoin and the dangerous fantasy of ‘apolitical’ money, YANIS 
VAROUFAKIS BLOG (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2013/04/22/bitcoin-and-
the-dangerous-fantasy-of-apolitical-money/. 
24 Id. 
25 Supra footnote 17 at 436. 
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that charge fees26. Discussing the advantage of bitcoin over cash money, Bill 
Gates stated that bitcoin is exciting because it shows how cheap transfer of fund 
from one place to another can be27. Every bitcoin transaction is verified and 
approved by the majority of the miners on the blockchain28. The transaction 
verification entitles the miner to a certain number of bitcoins -- 50 during the 
earlier days29. Due to the limited number of reward bitcoins that can be obtained 
as more bitcoins are created and the increased difficulty in solving the 
mathematical puzzle, the reward system is considered to be insufficient to 
incentivize miners. Today, miners earn bitcoins by charging transaction fees30. 
From 2015 to 2017, transactions fees in bitcoin have increased up to 1200 %31.  
Hence, the argument that bitcoin is cheap is not valid anymore.  
 With regard to other cryptocurrencies as well, the transaction fee is not 
that cheap32. It must be noted that there is difficulty in ascertaining how much 
one pays for each transaction due to the fact that the majority of the 
cryptocurrencies are expensive and used only by business entities or individuals 
with high income, which actually makes the cryptocurrency system inaccessible 
to people with low income or even independent researchers with insufficient 
fund to conduct experimental transactions. Transaction fees cannot be assessed 
without conducting transactions. Hence, it should not come as a surprise if 
evidence regarding transaction fees that come from news sources may be 
dismissed as unreliable. But some cryptocurrency exchanges today display their 
transaction fee schedule to users on their webpages. For instance as of February 
1, 2018, “Transferring funds from Bitstamp account to a credit card carries a 
flat  fee of $10  for amounts up to $1000 and  2% for transfers above  $1000.”33  
This means that to transfer 3000 dollar equivalent of Ether or any other 
Bitstamp traded cryptocurrency to his/her bank account, the user pays 60 
dollars. This is not a cheap transaction fee at all.  Comparatively, Coinbase 
discloses the fee at the time the user conducts the transaction.34.  
                                                
26 Edward V. Murphy, CONG. RESEARCH REP, Questions, Answers, and Analysis of Legal Issues 
5 (2015). 
27 Charlotte Krol, Bill Gates: Bitcoin is exciting because it is cheap, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 3, 
2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/11138905/Bill-Gates-Bitcoin-is-exciting-
because-it-is-cheap.html. 
28 Supra note 17 at 38. 
29 Supra note 12 at  217. 
30 Does Coinbase Pay Miner or Network Fees when Sending Digital Currency?, COINBASE 
(August 4 2017), https://support.coinbase.com/customer/portal/articles/815435-does-coinbase-
pay-bitcoin-miner-fees. 
31 Justin Connell, Bitcoin Transaction Fees Are Up More Than 1200% in Past Two Years, 
BITCOIN.COM (Feb. 22 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/bitcoin-transaction-fees-1200-past-
two-years/ 
32 See Alyssa Hertig, Bought your first Bitcoin or Ether? Brace for the Fees, COINDESK (Dec, 
18, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/bought-first-bitcoin-ether-now-brace-fees/. 
33 Unified Fee Schedule, BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net/fee_schedule/. 
34 Coinbase Pricing & Fees Disclosures, COINBASE (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://support.coinbase.com/customer/en/portal/articles/2109597-coinbase-pricing-
fees-disclosures.  
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1.2.2 TRUSTLESS 
 In traditional banking (payment services), customers should trust 
intermediaries including the bank and other third party payment service 
providers35, while in decentralized cryptocurrency systems, on a basic level, 
trust in an intermediary is unnecessary36. Cryptocurrencies are considered to 
remove the requirement of trusting intermediaries to process transactions.37 
Antonopoulos states: 
Here’s the most important effect of this new trust model of trust-
by-computation: no one actor is trusted, and no one needs to be 
trusted. There is no central authority or trusted third party in a 
distributed consensus network38. 
 The argument that blockchain removes trusted third parties assumes that 
the blockchain is the only infrastructure necessary for the functioning of 
cryptocurrencies. But that simply is naïve and perhaps a denial of the reality of 
cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies cannot function without other supporting 
infrastructures such as exchanges and digital wallets. First time users of 
cryptocurrencies must necessarily purchase cryptocurrencies from exchanges 
using traditional currencies and this renders the exchange a necessary part of 
the cryptocurrency ecosystem, unless the user in question is a miner who earns 
cryptocurrencies by mining; in the latter case, the user has the option to transact 
directly from the blockchain. Then users may need to store their 
cryptocurrencies in third-party administered digital wallets who should keep 
funds safely but may also use their power to the detriment of users.  
 Cryptocurrency exchanges and wallet providers are similar to traditional 
financial institutions. They are third-party intermediaries that operate on the 
same principle of trust. They are susceptible to the same problems traditional 
financial institutions are, including charging excessive fees, using personal 
information for unconsented purposes, insolvency and many other events. 
Moreover, exchange and digital wallets are vulnerable to hacking39 and other 
attacks that enormously affect users. In order to advance that cryptocurrencies 
do not require trust, a strong case has to be made that cryptocurrency exchanges 
                                                
35 Supra note 12 at 1.  
36 Brian Kelly, THE BITCOIN BIG BANG: HOW ALTERNATIVE CURRENCIES ARE ABOUT TO 
CHANGE THE WORLD 69 (2015). 
37 Carl P. Mullan, THE DIGITAL CURRENCY CHALLENGE: SHAPING ONLINE PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
THROUGH US FINANCIAL REGULATIONS 88 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
38Andrea Antonopoulos, Bitcoin security model: trust by computation A shift from trusting 
people to trusting math, RADAR (Feb. 20, 2014), http://radar.oreilly.com/2014/02/bitcoin-
security-model-trust-by-computation.html. 
39 See generally Mt. Gox Collapse of 214 resulting in loss of 850000.000 BTC due to hacking, 
BITCOIN TALK (Nov. 16, 2014), https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=57633; See Wolfie 
Zhao, $30 Million: Ether Reported Stolen Due to Parity Wallet Breach, COINDESK (July 19, 
2017), https://www.coindesk.com/30-million-ether-reported-stolen-parity-wallet-breach/.   
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and digital wallet service providers are not necessary part of the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem. 
 Last but not the least, one of the areas in which a trust by users is 
required is transaction confirmation. Because the cost for verification of 
transactions is covered mostly by transactions fees and different users can offer 
different fees, certain transactions could remain unconfirmed in the blockchain 
because miners could choose to dedicate their computational skill to higher fee 
transactions and that happens today more often40. The users who offer relatively 
lower transaction fee do not have the assurance that their transactions get 
confirmed in time. This requires a trust in the miners. Noted earlier, 
cryptocurrency exchange based fees are fixed by the exchanges and are not 
negotiable between the user and the miners, representing an exception to the 
negotiability of fee and its potential effect in delaying transactions. In the face 
of the above facts, it seems that trustlessness is merely marketing tool advanced 
by the developers and early backers of cryptocurrencies.  
 
1.2.3 DECENTRALIZED 
 
 Another attribute of cryptocurrencies is decentralization. It is argued 
that “the lack of central points of oversight, planning, and control makes 
cryptocurrencies less susceptible to catastrophic failure.’41 The blockchain is 
available to anyone who is able to engage in mining by dedicating their 
computational skill42. Decentralization is expressed not only in the lack of 
central point of control but also in the broadcasting of all transactions conducted 
using the cryptocurrency in question to the nodes (computers in the network)43.  
This in turn ensures transparency and prevents central point of failure as there 
is no single entity that controls the infrastructure, or can manipulate or tempt 
with the system44.   
 The claim of decentralization should be addressed differently for two 
category of cryptocurrencies, i.e., for the earlier generation cryptocurrencies 
such as bitcoin and ether and for the new generation cryptocurrencies. While 
for the former, in theory decentralization is possible, for the latter, it is almost 
non-existent by definition as shown later.  
                                                
40Erik Vohress, The True Cost of Bitcoin Transactions, MONEY AND STATE (Sep. 22, 2017), 
http://moneyandstate.com/the-true-cost-of-bitcoin-transactions/. 
41John Blocke, Decentralization Fetishism is Hindering Bitcoin’s Progress, MEDIUM, 
https://medium.com/@johnblocke/decentralization-fetishism-is-hindering-bitcoins-progress-
11cfa5c7964d. 
42 Supra note 18 at 177. 
43Pierluigi Cuccuru, Beyond bitcoin: an early overview on smart contracts 25 Int’l. J. of L. and 
Info. Tech. 1, 4. 
44 Id at 4-5.  
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For earlier generation cryptocurrencies, the blockchain is available to anyone 
who is willing and able to engage in mining45, which makes the system open 
and decentralized in principle. Nevertheless, questioning the claim of 
decentralization in bitcoin, De Filippi and Loveluck argue: 
…Hence, just like many other open source projects, there is a 
discrepancy between those who can provide input to the project 
(the community at large) and those who have the ultimate call 
as to where the project is going. Indeed, while anyone is entitled 
to submit changes to the software (such as bug fixes, 
incremental improvements, etc.), only a small number of 
individuals (the core developers) have the power to decide 
which changes shall be incorporated into the main branch of the 
software.46 
 Hence, in the governance structure of bitcoin, decentralization shrinks 
at the top level with implication not only for the democratic decision-making 
process but also on the technical functioning of the system47. The following is 
an example of how the decision-making process weakens the system. In the 
design of the blockchain for bitcoin, every block has a capacity of 1 megabyte48. 
The block size limit was placed disputably to ensure that the blockchain remains 
decentralized, since high block size means that there would be delays in 
transaction propagation as large miners can benefit at the expense of small 
miners, hence creating centralization49.  
Some of the core developers of bitcoin wanted to increase the block size 
on the ground that it has been arbitrarily fixed and was causing delay in 
transaction confirmation50. Some claimed that transactions remain unexecuted 
between 60 seconds to 14 hours as a direct consequence of the limit in block 
size51. Due to disagreement among the core developers on whether to increase 
the block size, Mike Hearn, one of the core developers resigned as a full-time 
bitcoin developer in January 201652. 
                                                
45Supra note 18, at 177. 
46 Primavera De Filippi & Benjamin Loveluck, The invisible politics of Bitcoin: governance 
crisis of a Decentralised infrastructure, 5 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 13 (2016). 
47 Id. 
48 Average Block Size, BLOCKCHAIN, https://blockchain.info/charts/avg-block-size; See also, 
supra note 44, at 7. 
49Arguments against increasing the block size?, REDDIT, 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/5p9iv8/arguments_against_increasing_the_block
_size/. 
50 Jeff Garzik, Bitcoin is Being Hot-Wired for Settlement, MEDIUM (Dec. 29, 2015), 
https://medium.com/@jgarzik/bitcoin-is-being-hot-wired-for-settlement-a5beb1df223a. 
51 Steve Sokolowski, Why Payouts Didn't Execute Today, PROHASHING (Dec. 11, 2015), 
https://forums.prohashing.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=679. 
52 Joseph Young, Mike Hearn Resigns and Leaves Bitcoin Permanently, NEWSBTC (Jan. 15, 
2016), http://www.newsbtc.com/2016/01/15/mike-hearn-resigns-and-leaves-bitcoin-
permanently/. 
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 Due to the sustained disagreement among the developers and miners, as 
of August 1, 2017, a split or what is referred to in technical term as “a hard 
fork” has occurred, leading to two different chains in the blockchain53. With the 
hard fork, two separate systems have been created, i.e., one that requires 
upgrading the software to Segwitx2 increasing the block size from 1 megabyte 
to 2 and stores some of the bitcoins off the blockchain, and the other which 
merely increases the block size to 8 megabytes54. The latter option, i.e., where 
the block size is increased to 8 megabytes, led to the creation of a new 
cryptocurrency – bitcoin cash (BCC)55. “Tuesday evening (1st of August 2017), 
several hours after the fork had been completed, Coin Market Cap reported that 
Bitcoin Cash (BCH) which is the newly created by using the 8 megabytes block 
is priced around $379.40, a fraction of the original Bitcoin’s value, which is 
priced at $2720.”56 Users who have stored their bitcoins on hard drive have the 
option to continue to use bitcoin, or the new currency bitcoin cash57. Today, 
both bitcoin and bitcoin cash are operating separately. 
 These stories suggest that bitcoin is not as decentralized as it is claimed 
to be. Whatever core changes take place to the bitcoin protocol depends on 
whether the core developers agree on it58. The core developers are not 
democratically elected group of people. They were chosen based on their 
expertise, their involvement in the project and their shared ideology with the 
founder59. The small miners down the ladder are insignificant as far as major 
changes are concerned unless they take matters into their hands and create a 
parallel system of currency, which actually weakens the system.  
 With respect to the NGCs, decentralization is officially compromised. 
The NGCs are based on the concept that only those who directly invest money 
in project have access to the infrastructure. Mining is controlled and monitored 
by a central authority, usually the team of developers that create the blockchain 
concerned and offer the tokens to the public for sale through Initial Coin 
Offering (ICO).  To illustrate, Evion white paper states that there are only two 
channels of mining operation60. The first one is where Evion, the company 
mines the tokens while the second is where a third-party that has a contract with 
Evion mines the tokens with the view to sharing profit61. Mining ENV token is 
not open to the public, leading to the conclusion that there is now a new type of 
                                                
53 Brooke Wanser, Bitcoin Cash: Five Facts You Need to Know, HEAVY (Aug. 3, 2017), 
http://heavy.com/news/2017/08/how-does-bitcoin-cash-work/. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 James Titcomb, Bitcoin Cash: Price of New Currency Rises after Bitcoin's Hard Fork, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 2, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/08/01/bitcoin-cash-
everything-need-know-bitcoins-hard-fork/. 
58See Team, BITCOIN CORE (2017), https://bitcoincore.org/en/team/.  
59 See supra note 46 at 13. 
60 Envion Mobile, Mining White Paper, 
https://www.envion.org/en/download/envion_whitepaper.pdf 
61 Id. 
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cryptocurrency that defies one of the major features of earlier cryptocurrencies 
by introducing centralization. 
 
1.2.4 PSEUDONYMOUS 
  
 The last feature of cryptocurrencies that makes them attractive is 
pseudonymity62. In bitcoin, although all transactions conducted by the user are 
publicly visible, they are represented by the public key (bitcoin address for 
instance), which is a unique set of numbers and letters serving as pseudonym63. 
The pseudonymity provided by blockchain can be de-anonymized using 
techniques that link the public key to the identity of the user64, for instance when 
a user purchases a cryptocurrency from an exchange using bank account. More 
complex techniques can also be applied to tackle pseudonymity65. But de-
anonymization takes time, requires technological expertise and money which 
makes it difficult. 
 In the era of mass collection and misuse of personal data by 
governments and giant corporations, the need to ensure 
anonymity/pseudonymity in many cases might be necessary66. But it is also the 
tool that enables illegality that must be carefully addressed. Viewed from 
practical point of view, it is the reason cryptocurrencies are preferred by certain 
users.  But even this feature is useful only if the user is a miner. For those who 
rely on exchanges and third party digital wallets, there is an identity verification 
process whereby the user must submit identity documents67.  
 
 
 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF 
CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
 
  2.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEGAL CLASSIFICATION 
 
  The clarity in the legal classification of cryptocurrencies is crucial in 
defining regulatory policies, ensuring legal certainty and rule of law. In 2016, a 
Florida State Circuit judge dismissed a money laundering charge on the ground 
that bitcoin did not qualify as a monetary instrument, a perquisite for money 
                                                
62 Hanna Halaburda and Miklos Sarvary, BEYOND BITCOIN: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL 
CURRENCIES 100 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); supra note 4, at 593.   
63 Pedro Franco, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: CRYPTOCURRENCY, ENGINEERING AND 
ECONOMICS 209 (Wiley, 2015).  
64 Id. 
65 Supra note 63, at 13.  
66 See Leon Hempel and Hans Lammerant, Impact Assessments as Negotiated Knowledge, 
REFORMING EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW (2015) 141. 
67 See Privacy Policy, BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net/privacy-policy/.  
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laundering offence under the Florida State Anti-Money Laundering Law68.  No 
similar case has been handled in the European Union so far, but the Florida 
Court decision clearly demonstrates why legal classification is consequential.  
 The significance of determining the legal category of cryptocurrencies 
transcends anti-money laundering law. Today, there are licensed 
cryptocurrency exchange platforms that perform exchange of traditional 
currencies to cryptocurrencies and vice-versa69. A new type of intermediary - 
cryptocurrency custodial wallet providers that offer custodial services to users, 
like banks provide bank account (deposit service) to customers, has emerged70. 
The rights and duties of these intermediaries towards their customers and 
regulators depend on how cryptocurrencies are classified. Determining whether 
cryptocurrencies should be taxed, how they should be taxed, and many more 
policy decisions vary depending on how cryptocurrencies are classified.   
 The lack of clear legal category for cryptocurrencies could lead to 
differential treatment of different financial institutions and their respective 
customers as well as other business entities. Hence, while a payment service 
provider transferring 50 dollars on behalf of its customer is subjected the Know-
Your-Customer requirement of anti-money laundering law that imposes 
burdensome obligations on the financial institution as well as the customer71, an 
intermediary and its customer using cryptocurrency could transfer thousands of 
dollars without being bound by similar requirements. A company investing in 
agriculture or green energy is subjected to the regulatory requirements of 
securities law while cryptocurrency centered companies are uncovered by 
securities law in Europe. This kind of differential application of legal rules to 
essentially similar institutions and persons exists in the areas of taxation, 
prudential regulation of financial institutions and other regulatory regimes to 
which financial institutions, companies and individual persons are subjected.  It 
is for this reason that the debate on the legal classification of cryptocurrencies 
is crucial to many stakeholders and is highly divisive. 
                                                
68 § Fl. St. Ord. 896.101(2)(d)-(e) 
69 List of Digital Currency Exchanges from Around the World, STEEMIT (June 2017), 
https://steemit.com/bitcoin/@xikandarxaheer/list-of-digital-currency-exchanges-from-around-
the-world.  
70 “A custodian wallet provider is an entity that provides services to safeguard private 
cryptographic keys on behalf of their customers, to holding, store and transfer virtual 
currencies.” PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
AMENDING DIRECTIVE (EU) 2015/849 ON THE PREVENTION OF THE USE OF THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM FOR THE PURPOSES OF MONEY LAUNDERING OR TERRORIST FINANCING AND AMENDING 
DIRECTIVE 2009/101/EC, COM (2016) 450, Proposed Addition of Paragraph 18(b) to Art. 3 of 
DIRECTIVE (EU) 2015/849 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 20 MAY 
2015 ON THE PREVENTION OF THE USE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FOR THE PURPOSES OF MONEY 
LAUNDERING OR TERRORIST FINANCING, AMENDING REGULATION (EU) NO 648/2012 OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, AND REPEALING DIRECTIVE 2005/60/EC OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL AND COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2006/70/EC, 
OJEU, L 141/73.  
71 Doug Hopton, MONEY LAUNDERING: A CONCISE GUIDE FOR ALL BUSINESSES 78 (Gower Pub. 
Ltd. 2009).  
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2.2 RECAP OF THE DEBATE ON LEGAL CLASSIFICATION 
 
 Since cryptocurrencies are also used for exchange of goods and services 
online72 as unit of account and store value fulfilling all the characteristics of the 
economic definition of money,73 some argue that cryptocurrencies should be 
treated as money74. Others argue that cryptocurrencies should be defined as 
commodity75, an argument which is corroborated by the decision US 
Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC)76 and the Internal Revenue 
Service Guideline on Taxation of Cryptocurrencies77. In Europe, the Central 
Bank of Finland has also classified cryptocurrencies are commodity78. The 
central point of contention in this regard is the lack of inherent value of 
cryptocurrencies79, while there scholars who argue that cryptocurrencies do 
have inherent value in that they enable less costly two-party transactions than 
traditional three-party transactions80.  
 In the US, the Federal Commodities Futures Trading Act defines 
commodities broadly to include all interests, services and rights as long as 
futures are traded on them that the CFTC used in its move to treat bitcoin as 
commodity81. Peculiarly, the EU level definition of commodity attributes 
tangibility to commodities thereby removing   cryptocurrencies out-rightly from 
the definition of commodity82. However, member states in the EU are free to 
adopt their own definition of commodities83, which is why the Finnish Central 
                                                
72 See 100+ Companies That Accept Bitcoins as Payment, EBAY (Dec. 11, 2015). 
http://www.ebay.com/gds/100-Companies-That-Accept-Bitcoins-As-Payment-
/10000000206483242/g.html.   
73 See Fredrick S. Mishkin, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 44 
(Pearson Education, 4th Edition, 2004). 
74 Eric P. Pacy, Tales from the Cryptocurrency: On Bitcoin, Square Pegs, and Round Holes, 49 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 121 (2014).  
75 Supra note 2. 
76 See U.S. v Coinflip, Inc., CFTC, Docket No. 15-29 (Sept. 17, 2015).  
77 IRS Virtual Currency Guidance: Virtual Currency Is Treated as Property for U.S. Federal Tax 
Purposes; General Rules for Property Transactions Apply, IRS, IR-2014-36 (March 25, 2014). 
78 Cameron Fuller, Bitcoin Vs. Bank of Finland: Cryptocurrencies Ruled as Commodities after 
Failing Money Test, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014). 
http://www.ibtimes.com/bitcoin-vs-bank-finland-cryptocurrencies-ruled-commodities-after-
failing-money-test-1545072. 
79 Nicholas Godlove, Regulatory Overview of Virtual Currency, 10 OKLA. J. OF L. & TECH. 1, 
26 (2014). 
80 Supra note 2 at 629. (“This means that the inherent value of a bitcoin is found in the difference 
of transaction costs between an online threeparty exchange, and a two-party exchange.”) 
81 7 U.S.C. § 1.a (9). 
82COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) NO 1287/2006 OF 10 AUGUST 2006 IMPLEMENTING 
DIRECTIVE 2004/39/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL AS REGARDS 
RECORDKEEPING OBLIGATIONS FOR INVESTMENT FIRMS, TRANSACTION REPORTING, MARKET 
TRANSPARENCY, ADMISSION OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TO TRADING, AND DEFINED TERMS 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THAT DIRECTIVE, OJEU L 241/1, Art. 2(1).  
83 Id, Recital 24 (“The definition of a commodity should not affect any other definition of that 
term in national legislation and other community legislation.”) 
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Bank has classified cryptocurrencies as commodity. The law on paper in the 
EU is indecisive and the issue is likely to remain controversial. 
 The debate on the legal classification of cryptocurrencies rather than 
being grounded on evidence and objectivity, tends to utilize radical subjectivity 
making it difficult to engage in constructive and solution oriented dialogue. It 
appears that the key reason for utilizing radical subjectivity is the need to define 
cryptocurrencies as something other than money, to avoid stricter state 
regulation or perhaps even a total ban, through polarization. Classifying 
cryptocurrencies as commodities as opposed to money could aid in avoiding the 
application of anti-money laundering law as evidenced by the decision of the 
California Court where the judge dismissed money laundering charge on the 
ground that bitcoin did not qualify as money84.  In 2014, Pacy argued: 
 …regulators and scholars have been reticent to treat 
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin as money, electing instead to 
attempt to fit this new technology into an existing regulatory 
framework as something other than money. By doing this, they 
create unnecessary complexity and sometimes absurd results.85  
 
 The situation has remained almost the same in the year 2018. Despite 
the fact that cryptocurrencies are exchangeable to and from traditional 
currencies and they are used to pay for things, there is unwillingness to call 
them money86. 
 
2.2.1 THE RADICAL SUBJECTIVISM 
 
 The attempt to define cryptocurrencies as a commodity and the 
methodology adopted reveals the utilization of radical subjectivism in certain 
regards, which comes at the expense of intellectual debates losing credibility 
and misrepresentation of facts.  
 Bitcoin has been compared to gold by its enthusiasts often in a 
misleading manner aimed at hyping users and investors87. The comparison 
focuses on the process of creation of bitcoin-mining a term which also describes 
gold extraction process88 and the competitive price for the two things89.  Often, 
the cryptocurrency/gold comparison is based on the notion that gold is 
expensive just because people subjectively view it as more valuable relative to 
other metallic commodities that are perhaps as durable and functional as gold. 
Hence, the argument goes that if the users view cryptocurrencies as valuable, 
                                                
84 Florida vs. Michel A. Espinoza, F14-2923, (11th Cir. July 22, 2016). 
85  Supra note 74 at 121. 
86 Id.  
87 Jocelyn Aspa, Is Bitcoin the New Gold?, INVESTING NEWS (Sep. 2017), 
https://investingnews.com/daily/tech-investing/fintech-investing/bitcoin-the-new-gold/. 
Accessed on 13 Jan. 18. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
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there is no reason not to treat them as gold. Reflecting this sentiment, Prentis 
argues: 
 
The price of traditional commodities, like gold, silver, and 
agricultural products, vary in accordance with their demand and 
scarcity. When more people want a commodity that has a fixed 
supply, the price rises. Similarly, the price of Bitcoin fluctuates 
according to the same fixed supply model…. Bitcoins are 
considered rare because there is a fixed supply of them, leading 
users to be willing to pay increasing prices to control them. The 
value of a bitcoin is ultimately driven by supply and demand—
a coin is worth whatever someone is willing to pay for it90. 
 
 Prentis asserts that it is appropriate to treat bitcoin as commodity91 
asserting that bitcoin has inherent value in its ability to reduce transaction cost 
by enabling less costly two-party transactions than traditional three-party 
transactions92. 
 While it is undeniable that users/speculators are willing to pay for 
bitcoin, bitcoin cash, ether or litecoin as much as they are willing to pay for 
gold, it is farfetched to go as far as arguing that bitcoin has intrinsic value. In 
examining whether bitcoin has inherent value, Godlove argues that “It has more 
characteristics in common with commodities than with currency, except for the 
most essential: It has no inherent value.”93  If intrinsic value is a value of a thing 
judged independently of its monetary use or a value of a thing for its own sake94, 
the question is, would cryptocurrencies remain useful if stripped of their ability 
to transfer fund? It requires an impossible mental gymnastics to give positive 
answer to this. One could make an exception for certain types of new generation 
cryptocurrencies that are used as means of taking part in certain investment 
ventures whose value is determined by their ability to enable users to have 
access to investment ventures or platforms and services provided in the digital 
economy (see infra § 3.2). 
 Bitcoin has also been compared with subterranean property95. In 2014, 
the US District Court of Western District of Washington handled a case in 
which it considered, inter alia, whether a contract to mine and deliver certain 
number of bitcoins constitutes an executory contract96. Examining the case, 
                                                
90 Supra note 2, at 628. 
91 Id at 626. 
92 Id at 629 (“This means that the inherent value of a bitcoin is found in the difference of 
transaction costs between an online three party exchange, and a two-party exchange.”) 
93 Supra note 79 at 26. 
94 Michael J. Zimmerman, Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/. 
95 Casey Doherty, Bitcoin and Bankruptcy – Understanding the Newest Potential Commodity, 
ABI J. 33, 28–33 (2014). 
96 In re CLI Holdings, Case No. 13–19,746 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet • Vol. 9 • 2018 
Regulating Decentralized Cryptocurrencies Under Payment Services Law: 
Lessons from European Union Law 
_______________________________________________________________ 
16 
 
Doherty wrote an article in which he stated that ‘Bitcoin also shares similarities 
to “subterranean” commodities through its extraction process, as demonstrated 
by in re CLI Holdings.’97 Citing Doherty’s article,  Borroni in addressing the 
legal framework for  bitcoin in the EU wrote “…the qualification of Bitcoins as 
a commodity stems from the case  in re CLI Holdings, whereby the court treated 
Bitcoins like a “subterranean commodity” (for example oil), due to the 
similarities arising from the “extraction process” shared by both of them”98.  
Doherty’s article and by extension Borroni’s, make a factually incorrect 
suggestion that the court drew a parallel between bitcoin and subterranean 
properties.  
 In re CLI Holdings99 on or about August 14, 2013, Bitvestment entered 
into a bitcoin services agreement with CoinLab, CLI Holdings Inc. and their 
respective affiliates (Amended Agreement)100. As per the agreement, 
Bitvestment paid the debtor, 75, 000 USD in return for which the debtor agreed 
to mine and deliver 7,984.006735 BTC to Bitvestment101. The debtor breached 
the contract failing to deliver the bitcoins mined after the amended agreement, 
following which, Bitvestment filed a lawsuit in the US District Court for the 
Southern District of NY against the Debtor seeking, inter alia, specific 
performance102.  
 On November 5, 2013, the District Court stayed the action against the 
debtor because the debtor filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy103  subsequently to which 
it filed a motion to reject the contract104. The debtor’s motion for rejection of 
the contract was based on U.S.C. § 365 which allows the judge to approve the 
rejection of executory contract by the trustee105. The court dismissed the motion. 
 In its reasoning the court reaffirmed that the key feature of executory 
contracts is that the “obligations of both parties are so far unperformed that the 
failure of either party to complete performance would constitute a material 
breach and thus excuse the performance of the other.”106 It ruled that since 
                                                
97 Supra note 95.  
98 Andrea Borroni, A Fuzzy Set in the Legal Domain: Bitcoins According to US Legal Formants, 
BITCOIN AND MOBILE PAYMENTS 104 (Palgrave Macmillan 2017). 
99 Supra note 96.  
100 In Re CLI Holdings Inc., Washington Western Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 13-19746-KAO 
(Feb. 7, 2014), Motion to Dismiss Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, p. 2. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 In Re CLI Holdings Inc., Washington Western Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 13-19746-KAO 
(15 November, 2013). 
105  11 U.S.C. §365(a). 
106 In Re CLI Holdings Inc., Washington Western Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 13-19746-
KA(12 Dec. 2013) , Order Denying Debtor's Motion to Reject Executory Contract with 
Bitvestment Partners LLC, p. 1.  Since the court’s order cites the parties’ submissions, the 
reasoning of the court is found in the Creditor (Bitvestments’s) objection to debtor’s motion to 
reject executory contract. See In Re  CLI Holdings Inc., Washington Western Bankruptcy 
Court, Case No. 13-19746-KAO(29 Nov. 2013),  Bitvestment Partners LLC’s objection to 
debtor’s motion to reject executory contract, p. 4.  The court relied on the definition of 
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Bitvestment has performed its obligation (paying 75, 000 USD), the debtor is 
the only party to the agreement with an ongoing obligation, namely to mine and 
deliver to Bitvestment the Bitcoins for which reason the contract was not 
executory107. 
 In this case, whether bitcoin is commodity was not relevant, despite this, 
Doherty used it to compare bitcoin with subterranean property108. He stated that 
“the court, in keeping with the analogous majority view of oil and gas precedent 
(though not citing it), found that the debtor could not reject a contract where the 
only performance of the interest-holder was to receive production.”109 The court 
did not cite oil and gas precedents by Doherty’s own admission but he still used 
the case to draw a parallel between bitcoin and subterranean properties.  To read 
oil and gas precedents into this decision is a complete misrepresentation of the 
court’s decision and the parties’ arguments as well as a betrayal of objectivity 
committed by Doherty in his attempt to fit the case to his narrative.   
Subterranean commodities such as oil have physical existence and intrinsic 
value whereas cryptocurrencies do not. This in and of itself makes the 
comparison a mere academic exercise with no use for policy decisions. The 
reality is that it sounds more convincing to push the agenda that 
cryptocurrencies are commodity and not money by misusing judicial decisions.  
 The stories highlighted suggest that due to the radical subjectivism 
utilized in the debate on the legal classification of cryptocurrencies, it is difficult 
to engage in a rational and policy oriented discussion.  Hence, it is more 
judicious to single out the areas in which cryptocurrencies are relevant and 
should be regulated and examine if the legal framework accommodates them or 
could inspire tailor-made regulatory framework for them, instead of getting lost 
in responding to industry driven talking points.  
2.3 THE LATEST DEVELOPMENT   
 
 The latest development affecting the legal classification of 
cryptocurrencies is the emergence of New Generation Cryptocurrencies 
(NGCs), created through complex Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), where the 
investors who invest money in a new cryptocurrency (token) are given various 
rights, including the right to share dividends derived from the investment of the 
company and the right to vote to determine the direction of the company110. 
 Illustrations of NGCs include GxCoin that gives token holders the right 
to vote on investment proposals by the promoters according to the term of the 
                                                
executory contracts provided by the Ninth Circuit in Marcus & Millichap Inc. v Munple, Ltd. 
(In re Munple), 868 F.2d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir.1989), cited by Bitvestment in its objection to 
the debtor’s motion for the rejection of the contract. 
107 Id. 
108 Supra note 95. 
109 Id. 
110  See supra note 3. 
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smart contract111 or Astronaut Token sold to investors with the view to investing 
the fund received from the investors in various listed cryptocurrencies and 
ICOs,112 token holders being entitled to receive dividends quarterly, pro rata to 
their coin holding113. More emblematically, Envion Company that offers ENV 
tokens has two mining operation channels114. The first one is the so-called 
proprietary mining operation where the company invests in, owns and operates 
the mining, whose proceed is distributed to token holders as earnings115.  The 
second component is where Third-Party Operations (TPO) where an 
independent company, acquires the mining operation from the company while 
the company operates them and the third-party operator is rewarded with a share 
and the 35% of the earnings of this business model is distributed to ENV token 
holders116.  
 In the US, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has ruled that 
tokens sold using these kinds of schemes qualify as investment contract117. In 
its 13th of November 2017 investor warning, the European Securities Market 
Authority (ESMA) identified risks pertaining to ICOs/NGCs118. It issued a 
supplementary statement in which it stated that depending on how the ICO is 
structured, the token may fall under the MiFiD II, the Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers (AIFMs) directive and be subjected to the prospectus 
directive119.  But it did not give a detailed guideline on when precisely ICOs 
may fall under the MiFiD II and the AIFMs directive.  
 It is established in the existing literature that the NGCs do qualify as 
security and may fall under the European Securities Market Law120, for which 
reason this article does not dedicate more space to the discussion. It suffices to 
state that the NGCs have not even made it to exchange platforms, if at all any 
of them could be traded on exchanges. Their chances of success and economic 
significance are difficult to estimate at this point as most of them are just 
launched or yet to be launched. Most importantly, some of the NGCs are based 
                                                
111 GxCoin, White Paper, 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/1b7d6b_a9eab92530a94bc0a09020a2cacbf266.pdf.  
112 Astronaut Capital, Astronaut White Paper, 3 https://astronaut.docsend.com/view/p4iazfu 
113 Id at 19. 
114 Supra note 60 at15.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMM’N, RELEASE 34-81207, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO, 12. 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf; See Cease and Desist Order, SEC 
Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-18304 (Dec. 11, 2017). 
118 ESMA, ESMA alerts investors to the high risks of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), ESMA50-
157-829, 2017, Available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-
157-829_ico_statement_investors.pdf.  Accessed on 13 Jan. 18. 
119 EUROPEAN SEC. AND MARKETS AUTH., ESMA50-157-828, 2017, ESMA alerts investors to 
the high risks of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-157-
828_ico_statement_firms.pdf. 
120 See supra note 3.  
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on the earlier cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin and ether and are mostly 
instruments of advancing the use of the earlier generation cryptocurrencies 
while others are accepted as means of payment only on specific platforms to 
allow the user to have access to services provided by those platforms and their 
community of users and developers there by limiting their chance of being 
accepted as universal methods of payment121.   
 To sum up, though the debate on legal classification of cryptocurrencies 
is profound and informative of the points of contention, it is also too polarized 
to guide policy decision and framing of legal rules and to a large degree 
influenced by ideological inclination and industry affiliation. Therefore, from 
the existing scholarship, readers can pick which side they are on. This article 
takes a more pragmatic approach and aims to examine the potential regulation 
of cryptocurrencies under payment services law; this can and should be done, 
regardless of how decentralized cryptocurrencies are defined. Cryptocurrencies 
are exchanged to and from traditional currencies122. They are being used to 
transfer fund from one place to another. Exchanges that handle them also handle 
traditional currencies123. Therefore, it is imperative to examine how payment 
services law treats them or should treat them and what the placement of 
cryptocurrencies under payment services law or designing a unique one for 
them entails. 
 
 
                                                
121 For instance, Crypto Investment Fund (CIF) ICO issues CIF Token that is offered to 
businesses that accept cryptocurrencies in their payment system using CIF payment processor. 
CIF Token gives these businesses access to utilities provided by CIF including education on the 
use of blockchain and cryptocurrencies. See CRYPTO IMPROVEMENT FUND ICO, Business 
Plan, (Nov. 2017), https://www.cryptoimprovementfund.io/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/CIF_BP_VF.pdf.  Astro Token gives investors the access to 
Astronaut Platform where users determine which tokens and ICOs to invest in based on research 
conducted by Astronaut. See ASTRONAUT CAPITAL, Astronaut White Paper, 4 
https://astronaut.docsend.com/view/p4iazfu.  These NGCs are tied to the existing 
cryptocurrencies one way or another. For instance, sale of tokens of AMLT token and Angel 
Token were conducted in Ether. See AMLT THE TOKEN OF COMPLIANCE, White Paper 
October 2017, 41, https://amlt.coinfirm.io/pdf/white-paper.pdf & ANGEL TOKEN 
WHITE PAPER, 25 https://angelinvestors.io/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Angel-Token-White-
Paper-3_0.pdf. While the above Tokens demonstrate that the NGCs that are being created are 
dependent on earlier general cryptocurrencies, there are also others that provide specific utility 
to investors/community of users but with no perceivable chance of being payment methods. For 
instance Paragon Token (PGR) provides users access to various blockchain based services 
towards the legalization of Cannabis. PARAGON WHITE PAPER VERSION 1.0(2017), p. 8, 
https://paragoncoin.com/whitepaper.pdf. The list can go on and on. The key point to 
make is that the new tokens/cryptocurrencies that are being issued are either based on earlier 
cryptocurrencies or have limited use and therefore unlikely to be dominant methods of payment. 
122 See generally BITSTAMP, 
https://www.bitstamp.net/account/login/?next=/market/order/instant/; COINBASE, 
https://www.coinbase.com/?r=521e2d1ec6d27cc790000091.  
123 Id. 
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3. CRYPTOCURRENCIES UNDER EU PAYMENT SERVICES LAW  
 
 The regulation of cryptocurrencies under the payment services law 
has been explored by scholars124. But most of the previous works ignore 
the central problem- decentralization (see infra section 3.7). This part of 
the article examines the legal framework governing payment services in 
the EU with the view to showing how decentralization is a significant 
impediment to constructing tailor-made legal framework for payment 
services. 
 
3.1 THE SINGLE EURO PAYMENT AREA REGULATION 
 
Since 2012, the European Union has implemented a legal framework 
governing Single Euro Area Payment (SEPA Regulation) that aims to provide 
uniform electronic payment system across the European Union.125 The SEPA 
Regulation “lays down rules for credit transfer and direct debit transactions 
denominated in euro within the EU where both the payer’s payment service 
provider and the payee’s payment service provider are located in the EU, or 
where the sole payment service provider (PSP) involved in the payment 
transaction is located in the Union”126. The SEPA Regulation sets common rules 
for credit transfer and debit transactions including conditions of payment, fees 
and governs the rights and duties of the payment service providers and users in 
general127. 
Since payments made in cryptocurrencies do not qualify as credit transfer or 
debit transactions, the SEPA regulation does not govern them. However, 
cryptocurrency exchanges should and do comply with SEPA Regulation when 
users deposit Euros in their digital wallet to purchase cryptocurrencies or to 
withdraw their cryptocurrencies in Euros.128  But SEPA Regulation does not 
regulate payments effected exclusively in cryptocurrencies as the payments 
must be denominated in Euro as a general rule.129 Therefore, under SEPA 
Regulation, the key problem with cryptocurrencies is the inability of 
                                                
124 Tara Mandjee, Bitcoin, its Legal Classification, and its Regulatory Framework, 15 J. OF BUS. 
& SEC. L. 157 (2016); Noah Vardi, Bit by Bit: Assessing the Legal Nature of Virtual Currencies, 
BITCOIN AND MOBILE PAYMENTS 66-67 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Harry Leinonen, 
Decentralised Blockchained and Centralised Real-Time Payment Ledgers: Development 
Trends and Basic Requirements, TRANSFORMING PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 236-260 
(Palgrave McMillan, 2016).  
125  REGULATION (EU) NO 260/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL OF 14 MARCH 2012 ESTABLISHING TECHNICAL AND BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS 
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cryptocurrencies to qualify as currency of the EU member states covered by the 
regulation, for which reason they are not covered by it. 
 
3.2 THE ELECTRONIC MONEY DIRECTIVE 
 
 When examining cryptocurrencies and payments services, the 
Electronic Money Directive of 2009130 appears relevant due to the digital nature 
of electronic money which makes it closely resemble cryptocurrencies.  But as 
Vardi points out, the electronic money directive does not apply to 
cryptocurrencies because (a) electronic money is issued in exchange for the 
transfer of corresponding traditional currency at par value and (b) it must be 
redeemable into traditional a currency at par value upon request of the electronic 
money holder131.   
 Strictly speaking, cryptocurrencies are not issued in exchange for real 
currency. Of course, as a factual matter, a user who wishes to acquire 
cryptocurrency needs to purchase it from an exchange with real currency or 
other cryptocurrencies. But this is not equivalent to an issuer receiving an 
equivalent in a real currency. The seller of the cryptocurrency is not necessarily 
the issuer. Second, whoever sells a cryptocurrency in general does not have the 
duty to redeem it for real currency. So clearly, cryptocurrencies do not qualify 
as electronic money.  
 
3.3 THE PAYMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE 
 
 The latest EU directive governing payment services, the Payment 
Services in the Internal Market Directive (PSD II)132  has no specific provision 
dedicated to cryptocurrencies. The PSD II applies to payment services133 
including services enabling cash to be placed on a payment account and all the 
operations required for operating a payment account134; services enabling cash 
withdrawals135; execution of payment transactions, including transfers of funds 
on a payment account with the user’s payment service provider or with another 
payment service provider136; execution of payment transactions where the funds 
are covered by a credit line for a payment service user137;  issuing of payment 
                                                
130 EUROPEAN COMM’N, DIRECTIVE 2009/110/EC OF 16.9.2009 ON THE TAKING UP, PURSUIT AND 
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION OF THE BUSINESS OF ELECTRONIC MONEY INSTITUTIONS, 7 (October 
10, 2009) 
131 Supra note 124 at 61; See Id Arts 2(2) & Arts 11(2). 
132 EUROPEAN COMM’N, DIRECTIVE 2015/2366 /EC OF 25 NOVEMBER 2015 ON PAYMENT 
SERVICES IN THE INTERNAL MARKET, AMENDING DIRECTIVES 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC AND 
2013/36/EU AND REGULATION (EU) NO 1093/2010, AND REPEALING DIRECTIVE 
2007/64/EC(2015), OJEU, L 337/35. 
133 Id Art. 2(1).  
134 Id Annex I (1). 
135 Id Annex I (2) 
136 Id Annex 1(3) 
137 Id Annex 1(4).  
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet • Vol. 9 • 2018 
Regulating Decentralized Cryptocurrencies Under Payment Services Law: 
Lessons from European Union Law 
_______________________________________________________________ 
22 
 
instruments and/or acquiring of payment transaction138; money remittance139; 
payment Initiation Service140; and account Information.141 
 The underlying feature of the concept of payment service under the 
directive is transfer or administration of fund/money and activities aimed at 
facilitating it142. The directive applies to payments services provided in the 
currency of EU members states and under certain conditions in a currency of a 
Non-EU state143.  To that effect the directive states that “payments shall be made 
in the currency agreed between the parties.”144 Because cryptocurrencies are not 
currencies (legal tender of EU member states or third countries), the payment 
services directive does not apply to them.  
 
3.4 THE LESSON FROM SKATTEVERKET V DAVID HEDQVIST 
 
 Skatteverket v David is the first case involving bitcoin decided by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ)145.  It involved the interpretation of the 
Directive on Common system of VAT146. David Hedqvist a Swedish National 
sought a preliminary decision from the Swedish “Revenue Law Commission on 
whether transactions to exchange traditional currency for the bitcoin or vice-
versa, which he wished to perform through a company, were subject to VAT.”147 
The Revenue Law Commission opined that Hedqvist’s activities were not 
subject to VAT because they are exempt under the Common VAT Directive 
which requires members to exempt transactions “including negotiation 
concerning currency, bank notes and coins used as legal tender”.148  
 The Swedish Tax Authority appealed the case to the Swedish 
Administrative Supreme Court challenging the decision of the Swedish 
Revenue Law Commission149. Being uncertain whether bitcoin exchange is 
exempt under the relevant provision of the directive, the Swedish 
Administrative Supreme Court made a preliminary reference to the ECJ150. 
 The ECJ concluded that (a) exchange of bitcoin to or from other 
currencies is supply of service for consideration151. However, (b) it is exempt 
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under article 135(1) (e) of the Common VAT directive152. The court in particular 
argued that bitcoin is not a tangible property153 rather it is a means of payment 
accepted by the parties though it is not a legal tender154.  In its reasoning the 
court stated “… the ‘bitcoin’ virtual currency has no other purpose than to be a 
means of payment”155.  
 The ECJ showed a pragmatism in resolving the dispute without 
classifying bitcoin as anything that is statutorily recognized, by labelling it as 
“a means of payment”. It is to be noted that under the PSD II, “payment 
instrument”, not “means of payment” is defined as ‘‘a personalised device(s) 
and/or set of procedures agreed between the payment service user and the 
payment service provider and used in order to initiate a payment order.”156 The 
relevant provision of the VAT directive essentially exempts negotiations 
involving legal tenders from VAT157. It can be argued that the fact that the ECJ 
put currencies and bitcoin together by treating them under this provision 
indicates that at least for the purpose of the VAT directive, the court thinks that 
bitcoin is equivalent to currency but this is only a speculation considering that 
the court, it seems, intentionally avoided calling it money.  
 
3.5  PAYMENT SERVICES LAW FOR CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
 
 The European Central Bank indicated in its 2015 report on 
cryptocurrencies that “In the EU, virtual currency is not currently regulated and 
cannot be regarded as being subject to the (current) PSD or the EMD. As the 
phenomenon is still relatively new and also moving into different areas, it would 
be too early to try making new, tailor-made legislation”158. Three years later, 
there is no effort in designing tailor-made payment service law for 
cryptocurrencies. More importantly, the suggestion that it is possible to 
designing sui generis payment services law for cryptocurrencies has never been 
critically examined. The task faces enormous challenges tied to the fact that it 
is difficult to define payment service provider using decentralized 
cryptocurrencies in cases where cryptocurrency users have direct access to the 
blockchain with no third party that has meaningful control over transfer of 
funds. The blockchain does not qualify as a payment service provider or 
financial institution as it is neither centrally managed by a single institution 
(save in cases of centralized cryptocurrencies), nor in a position to get an 
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authorization to serve as payment service provider. Most payments in 
cryptocurrency are effected directly between the payer and the payee.  
 Hughes and Middlebrook extensively examine possible different 
models for the regulation of cryptocurrency intermediaries in the US159. Their 
work starts by clearly stating that” on the blockchain transaction”, i.e., direct 
transfer of fund from a sender to receiver which is recorded on the public ledger 
and can be verified by other users -does not go through an intermediary160. 
Hence, they examine the possible regulatory models only for “off the 
blockchain” transactions, where “intermediaries act as custodians of 
cryptocurrency or cryptocurrency credentials originally belonging to their 
clients and may facilitate and clear transactions for clients without updating the 
public ledger.”161 They examine various provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, Art. 4 and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act as implemented by regulation 
E with the view of constructing how these statutes can serve as the basis for 
designing specific regulation for cryptocurrency intermediaries162.  
 There is no comprehensive legal research assessing the challenges of 
constructing payment services law for cryptocurrencies. The approach to 
addressing this issue which gives regulators, lawyers and consumers a clear and 
practical information on the issue is the one that points out the key challenge 
that should be tackled and how it could be tackled if at all possible. This article 
identifies technical deficiency as the single greatest challenge to building 
payment system based on decentralized cryptocurrencies.  
 
3.5.1 TECHNICAL DEFICIENCY 
 
 The most significant challenge to creating a payment system based on 
cryptocurrencies is the technical deficiency of decentralized cryptocurrencies.  
If this challenge is not tackled, a regulatory framework is guaranteed to be 
ineffective. Various regulatory rules that apply to payment service providers 
regulated by the EU payment services law could equally apply to payment 
service provisions using cryptocurrencies. For instance, general prudential 
requirements aimed at ensuring the soundness of financial institutions that 
requires, among others, that payment service providers maintain certain amount 
of capital can be imposed on financial institutions handling cryptocurrencies163. 
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Under the payment services directive, payment service providers are expected 
to maintain initial capital and own fund that must not fall below a certain 
amount164.  Any kind of regulatory rule aimed at ensuring the financial 
soundness of payment service providers could be applied to payment service 
providers using cryptocurrencies. But the technical deficiency that lies at the 
foundation of cryptocurrencies and blockchain is difficult to resolve. 
 Technical deficiency refers to the defect in the technological 
infrastructure of decentralized cryptocurrencies that makes it difficult to define 
payment services providers that are capable of satisfying the requirements 
necessary to obtain license/authorization to engage in payment services 
activities.  The lack of the necessary technical infrastructure of decentralized 
cryptocurrencies contradicts some of the core principles controlling 
authorization of payment service providers. Tackling decentralization goes to 
the core of regulating cryptocurrencies as payment system. Other issues such as 
issues of security, consumer protection, and bankruptcy are secondary and 
resolvable. Discussing these issues without first fixing the technical deficiency, 
in particular decentralization is futile.  
 To use an analogy -  to tame a black mamba, one of the deadliest snakes 
in the world, upon capturing it  a prudent person must defang it before taking 
any other measure. To capture the snake and put it in a cage with its fang intact 
is likely to end in the snake killing either the capturer who intends to tame it or 
other people.  The capturer could say that the cage is secure enough, or he/she 
puts on gloves, boots and long sleeve clothes in handling the snake. But none 
of these cautionary measures can assure that the snake does not bite and kill 
someone. The most efficient and effective measure to avoid being killed by the 
black mamba during taming is to take out its fangs. Discussing other cautionary 
measures is imprudent and most likely useless. Decentralized cryptocurrencies 
are like a black mamba, and decentralization is like the fang of the black 
mamba. Attempting to regulate decentralized cryptocurrencies without first 
tackling its decentralization is like attempting to tame the black mamba without 
removing its fang. 
 
A. LACK OF THE NECESSARY 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND 
TRANSPARENT RULES OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 Under the PSD II, in order to obtain an authorization, a payment service 
institution must have prudent management, robust governance arrangement, 
clear organizational structure and well-defined, transparent and consistent lines 
of responsibility165. The PSD II states in particular that: 
 
The competent authorities shall grant an authorisation only if, 
taking into account the need to ensure the sound and prudent 
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management of a payment institution, the payment institution 
has robust governance arrangements for its payment services 
business, which include a clear organisational structure with 
well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, 
effective procedures to identify, manage, monitor and report the 
risks to which it is or might be exposed,…166 
 
 Decentralized cryptocurrencies are inimical to the requirements of 
prudent management, robust governance arrangement, clear organizational 
structure and well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility 
because transfer of fund can be made directly from the sender (payer) to the 
receiver (payee), to be confirmed by miners on the blockchain, with no central 
processing authority167. There is neither an organizational structure of 
management, nor lines of responsibility that requires miners to engage in 
mining or imposes an obligation on them to confirm transactions.   
 Even in cases where custodian digital wallet providers are involved in 
facilitating payment, though they could meet the requirements of prudent and 
responsible management and hence could obtain authorization, they cannot 
solve the problem arising from “on-the blockchain” transactions where users do 
not go through custodian wallet providers. In other words, unless “on-the 
blockchain” transactions are prohibited by making it mandatory for users to go 
through digital wallet providers or exchanges to conduct transactions in 
cryptocurrencies, it is impossible to design a regulatory framework akin to the 
payment services directive for cryptocurrencies. Assuming further that users do 
use intermediaries to conduct their transactions, the intermediaries themselves 
depend on the blockchain for final settlement since any cryptocurrency 
transaction must be registered on the blockchain.  
 To take a practical example, what happens if “A” transfers 1 Bitcoin to 
“B” in payment and offers a fee, the equivalent of 10 dollars in bitcoin and the 
transaction remains unexecuted for two days as a result of which the underlining 
contract is cancelled by the counter-party or “A” could not book his/her hotel, 
because the miners simply did not confirm the transaction on the ground that 
the transaction fee was too low? In payment services provided by traditional 
currencies, the PSD II makes the payment service provider liable for any 
charges and interest resulting from the non-execution or defective, including 
late execution of the payment transaction168. For “on the blockchain” 
transactions, no similar rule could be designed just because there is no central 
office that is in charge of executing payments. Since the miner could be anyone 
in the world, in case of his/her failure to confirm a transaction, there is no way 
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for a supervisory authority to design a complaint mechanism or a redress and 
penalty systems169. 
 If a legal rule which requires that all transactions in cryptocurrencies go 
through intermediaries is to be setup, the same enforcement problem persists. 
How could the miners distinguish between transactions coming from 
intermediaries on the one hand and those coming from other entities and 
individual users on the other hand? After all, every cryptocurrency user has only 
a public key on the blockchain170 without name or any other personal 
identification information. Therefore, technically, it is not possible to 
implement such as rule with respect to decentralized cryptocurrencies.  
 
B. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
COUNTERING TERRORISM FINANCING LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ISSUE 
 
 All financial institutions are obliged to operate in compliance with the 
existing rules governing combating money laundering and countering terrorism 
financing enshrined in the EU Anti-Money Laundering and Countering 
Terrorism Financing Directive (“the AML/CTF Directive (2015)”)171. This 
directive was formally implemented in the member states of the EU by the 26 
of June 2017172. Since this directive did not cover cryptocurrencies, the 
European Commission has proposed an amendment - “the Proposed AML/CTF 
Directive173.  
 The proposed AML/CTF directive recognizes that under the applicable 
law, obligations imposed on traditional financial institutions including the duty 
to identify suspicious activities aimed at combating money laundering and 
terrorism financing using the Union's financial system do not apply to 
cryptocurrency exchange services providers and custodian wallet providers174. 
It also recognizes that the anonymity provided by cryptocurrencies, enabling 
criminal behaviours would be more hindrance than an asset for cryptocurrencies 
and sets to tackle anonymity175. Accordingly, the proposed amendment is set to 
extend the application of AML/CTF Law to cryptocurrencies and 
intermediaries dealing with them176, defines the new institutions such as 
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custodian wallet providers177, and requires member states to prohibit financial 
institutions from keeping anonymous accounts, anonymous passbooks, or 
anonymous safe deposit boxes178.  
 Pursuant to its purpose, the proposed directive has a set of measures 
aimed at combating money laundering and terrorism financing using 
cryptocurrencies. Two of the oddest notions under the proposed directive are 
the potential setting up and maintaining of a central database for registering 
cryptocurrency users' identities accessible to Financial Intelligence Units of 
member states and self-declaration forms for users179.  These ideas are odd as 
they deviate from measures imposed by AML/CTF laws applicable to 
traditional financial institutions. To require user database in traditional financial 
service would be requiring a central registry for users of the USD, the Euro or 
Yuen. While this measure may be aimed to identifying cryptocurrency users 
who have direct access to the blockchain because they do not use custodial 
digital wallets or exchanges, it is nearly impossible to enforce it.  If users simply 
fail to register or self-declare, law enforcement has to put all individuals who 
have computer on which the blockchin node can be downloaded as suspects for 
violating the rule.  
 By proposing legal rules that are patently ineffective, the European 
Commission and the relevant institutions that took part in drafting the proposed 
AML/CTF as related to cryptocurrencies are dodging the question of regulating 
miners and the blockchain. When the blockahin is the central point of 
decentralized cryptocurrencies and the miners are like bankers who handle 
transactions, it is either naïve or intentionally dodgy trying to regulate only 
users and intermediaries whose role in the ecosystem of cryptocurrencies is only 
secondary. 
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4. THE FUTURE OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES AS PAYMENT SYSTEM 
 
 This article has shown that the existing EU legislation governing 
payment services do not apply to cryptocurrencies. Moreover, there is an 
impediment to constructing tailor-made payment services law for 
cryptocurrencies ingrained in the technical design of decentralized 
cryptocurrencies. But what does the future hold for cryptocurrencies as payment 
system? There are two alternative solutions both of which are not reassuring to 
anyone who wants to see cryptocurrencies-succeed centralization or state 
cryptocurrency. 
 
4.1 CENTRALIZATION 
 
 By now it must be an open secret that decentralization is considered to 
be the strongest attribute of cryptocurrencies. But from regulatory point of view, 
it is the feature that works against cryptocurrencies as it would eventually hurt 
the chance of designing reasonable regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies. 
Speaking of the virtue of decentralization, Antonopoulos states: 
 
Early digital currencies used a central clearinghouse to settle all 
transactions at regular intervals, just like a traditional banking 
system. Unfortunately, in most cases these nascent digital 
currencies were targeted by worried governments and eventually 
litigated out of existence. Some failed in spectacular crashes 
when the parent company liquidated abruptly. To be robust 
against intervention by antagonists, whether legitimate 
governments or criminal elements, a decentralized digital 
currency was needed to avoid a single point of attack. Bitcoin is 
such a system, completely decentralized by design, and free of 
any central authority or point of control that can be attacked or 
corrupted180.  
 
 Antonopoulos thinks that the complete decentralization of bitcoin 
ensures robustness and is government intervention-proof181.  The assertion may 
be correct. But the absurdity in praising complete decentralization as a saviour 
of cryptocurrencies from legitimate governments speaks volumes about how 
irresponsible some of the cryptocurrency backers can be. Why should 
legitimate governments not be able to reasonably regulate cryptocurrencies?  
But setting that question aside, complete decentralisation is actually the single 
greatest adversary of cryptocurrencies with the potential to end them or render 
them just experimental projects, with no meaningful use for the broader 
economy. In order to create a robust payment system, it is absolutely imperative 
to have a central entity that obtains authorization to engage in providing 
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payment services, is able to take responsibility for facilitating payments and is 
held accountable and liable for any obligations arising from its activities. There 
is simply no system that is sustainable with no central authority that is held 
accountable to the community of users. But centralization is undesirable for at 
least two reasons. It creates a private monopoly and it does not entirely resolve 
the accountability deficit that is deeply rooted in the decentralized 
cryptocurrencies.  
 
A. PRIVATE MONOPOLY 
 
 Centralizing cryptocurrencies has the potential to create a monopoly. 
One of the political motives for creating bitcoin is the aversion to a central bank 
monopoly over the creation and regulation of money as acknowledged by the 
European Central Bank stating that “the following ideas are generally shared 
by Bitcoin and its supporters: they see bitcoin as a good starting point to end 
the monopoly central banks have in the issuance of money”182. The intention 
behind cryptocurrencies is to challenge the existing financial system which 
presupposes the monopoly of central banks in money creation and mainstream 
financial institutions in the provision of financial services. If centralized 
cryptocurrency is to be advocated for, it would mark the official reversal of this 
objective of cryptocurrencies.  
 Centralization of cryptocurrencies and blockchain could take various 
forms. The simplest form is where a company or a group of companies highly 
regulated by the state create(s) cryptocurrencies. Centralization could also be 
achieved by leaving cryptocurrencies as decentralized as they are today but 
requiring that all transactions be conducted through intermediaries with no 
direct access by the user to the blockchain.  But the latter route is costly in terms 
of enforcing the rules that impose the use of intermediaries. But both options 
would essentially create a conducive atmosphere for the monopoly in the 
delivery of payment services, the very idea decentralized cryptocurrencies were 
designed to tackle.  
 
B. GENERAL LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
 As cryptocurrencies stand today, lack of accountability of developers 
and miners for any conduct that may undermine monetary policy or payment 
system is of an immense concern. The European Central Bank echoed the 
sentiment that cryptocurrencies are not threat to monetary policy arguing that 
they are irrelevant to the real economy183 and that the upper limit placed on 
bitcoin creation by its protocol ensures that it has no inflationary effect184.  It 
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reached similar conclusion regarding the potential adverse effect of 
cryptocurrencies on the stability of EU payment system185. 
 Today, the notion that the upper protocol based limit to the creation of 
bitcoin is a determining factor in the effect of cryptocurrencies on monetary 
policy or payment system should not be taken seriously. Bitcoin protocol is run 
by individuals who have no mandate given to them by any group of people. If 
there is an agreement amongst them, there is no reason the protocol cannot be 
changed. There is already an evidence that the protocol is not faithfully adhered 
to. Due to the sustained disagreement among the developers and miners, as of 
August 1, 2017, a split or what is referred to in technical term as “a hard fork” 
has occurred, leading to two different chains in the bitcoin blockchain186. With 
the hard fork, two separate systems have been created, i.e., one that requires 
upgrading the software to Segwitx2 increasing the block size from 1 megabyte 
to 2 and stores some of the bitcoins off the blockchain, and the other which 
merely increases the block size to 8 megabytes187. The latter option led to the 
creation of a new cryptocurrency – the Bitcoin Cash (BCC)188, which is 
operating parallel to bitcoin. Protocol based limit to bitcoin is a hoax. If it is 
not, bitcoin advocates must answer why bitcoin and bitcoin cash, both traded 
on cryptocurrency exchanges, that emanated from the bitcoin blockchain are 
operating side-by-side but as independent cryptocurrencies.   
 Another important factor that must be taken into account in determining 
the supply of cryptocurrencies and their disruptive effect on the financial system 
in general and payment system in particular is that the cryptocurrency systems 
are run by self-interest maximizing individuals who are motivated by money. 
They are not motivated by the desire to build a better payment system for the 
society.  It is for this reason that ideas such as bitcoin’s potential to help banking 
the unbanked189, propagated by the bitcoin advocates happened to be only a 
hoax when the cryptocurrency community turned around and started advancing 
that cryptocurrencies are just assets with skyrocketing prices. On December 6, 
2017, on Bitstamp, a Luxembourg based cryptocurrency exchange, 1 bitcoin 
was worth over 12, 000 USD, 1 Litcoin was worth over 99 USD, and 1 Ether 
was worth over 433 USD190.  These prices surely fluctuate, regardless of which, 
it is reasonable to ask which one of these cryptocurrencies is accessible to the 
unbanked. 
 The campaign for cryptocurrencies is based hyperbole and a degree of 
deceptive advertising, in the light of which it is not rational to believe that the 
project genuinely provides a better alternative to the existing state monopoly 
over money creation and regulation. Neither would cryptocurrencies, left to 
                                                
185 Supra note 158 at 27. 
186 Bitcoin Cash: 5 Fast Facts you need to Know, HEAVY, http://heavy.com/news/2017/08/how-
does-bitcoin-cash-work/.  
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Nyshka Chandran, Can bitcoin help the world's unbanked?, CNBC (July 5, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/05/can-bitcoin-help-the-worlds-unbanked.html. 
190 See BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net/ 
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private entities, offer stable and reliable system of payment. Centralisation of 
cryptocurrencies would not solve the issues of accountability unless the level 
of centralization goes to the extent of creating cryptocurrencies that are bound 
by national rules and operate at a national level.  
  
4.2 STATE CRYPTOCURRENCY 
 
 State cryptocurrency is the most extreme policy direction that could be 
taken with respect to cryptocurrencies. At the very outset, it ought to be clear 
that state/national cryptocurrency potentially addresses not only the issues of 
payment system but also monetary policy at large, provided that the use of 
cryptocurrencies as medium of exchange for goods and services become 
mainstream. At this point in time, there is no precise data on the volume of 
transactions conducted in cryptocurrencies and it is not useful to try to look for 
data or to speculate. But should cryptocurrencies become a mainstream system 
of payment, a revision of monetary policy would be inevitable191. This, among 
others, requires issuing state cryptocurrencies because there is simply no 
evidence suggesting that cryptocurrencies as private currencies would function. 
Neither are there rules to that effect. 
 In emphasizing on the importance of rule based monetary system, 
Friedman argued that rule based monetary system “will have the effect of 
enabling the public to exercise control over monetary policy through its political 
authorities, while at the same time it will prevent monetary policy from being 
subject to the day-by-day whim of political authorities.’192 Freidman’s proposal 
for rule based monetary policy is a result of his objection to the prevailing 
monetary policy that is based on wide discretion exercised by independent 
authorities(central banks), which he considers is contrary to ensuring stable 
monetary system193. If state-run monetary policies should be subject to tight rule 
based controls, there no reason similar standards should not be applied with 
regard to cryptocurrencies.  
 But assuming that the time to discuss the monetary impact of 
cryptocurrencies and the regulatory response for that is not yet due, state 
cryptocurrency would significantly tackle the difficulty in taming 
cryptocurrencies even merely as payment systems. 
 
A. EXPLORING THE STATE CRYPTOCURRENCY 
PROPOSITION 
 
 The concept of state cryptocurrency was alluded to in 2016 by the 
current chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Powell who made the suggestion 
                                                
191 See supra note 175 at 23; Wallace Young, What Community Bankers Should Know About 
Virtual Currencies, FED. RESERVE SYS. (2015), 2. 
192 Milton Friedman, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 51(University of Chicago Press, 2002).  
193 Id. 
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that central banks could issue their own cryptocurrencies by using distributed 
digital ledger technology194.  The Central Bank of China has launched a 
prototype of its cryptocurrency195. But no specific date is set for the launching 
of the Chinese state cryptocurrency. In theory, the solution maintains the 
benefits of distributed digital ledger and the speed and convenience (if any) 
associated with cryptocurrencies. But two general questions must be answered 
with respect to the idea of state cryptocurrency. The first one is whether the 
system solves problems inherent in cryptocurrencies as we know them today. 
The second one is, even if a state cryptocurrency naturally mitigates the risks 
associated with decentralized cryptocurrencies, whether it is feasible.  
 
B. THE FEASIBILITY OF STATE CRYPTOCURRENCY 
 
 A proposal for state cryptocurrency is not advocated for in mainstream 
scholarship. Michael states that “peer-to-peer central bank is the most obvious 
public institution that might be built on a cryptocurrency, because a 
cryptocurrency essentially performs the function of a central bank.”196 He 
spends the rest of his argument addressing how a software based creation of 
money could be used to control money growth and inflation dedicating little 
discussion to how the Peer-to-Peer central bank works.  
 According to a paper published online by Deloitte, state-sponsored 
cryptocurrency differs from decentralized cryptocurrencies, inter alia, in the 
lack of cap on money supply contained on the ledger, in the reduced stigma and 
fear of adoption, official sanction and use of national currency and in the 
regulation of Ledger miners and the low probability of fluctuation in exchange 
rate197. In theory, state cryptocurrency should incorporate the essential features 
of cryptocurrencies with the necessary modification to ensure that the system 
runs smoothly by balancing decentralisation and a level of centralization 
necessary to govern the blockchain not only by rules of algorithm but also by 
legal rules that apply to the conduct of miners and other intermediaries that 
partake in maintaining the ecosystem. Its most important feature must be that it 
replicates cryptocurrencies to the maximum extent possible. 
 First, a state cryptocurrency should be created by the national central 
bank with due regard to its incumbent monetary policy priorities, including 
                                                
194 Jerome H. Powell, Remarks at Blockchain: The Future of Finance and Capital Markets? 
The Yale Law School Center for the Study of Corporate Law (March 3 2017) transcript 
available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20170303a.htm. 
195 China Is Developing its Own Digital Currency, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-23/pboc-is-going-digital-as-mobile-
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inflation control. Second, the state cryptocurrency should maintain a level of 
decentralization by allowing banks and financial institution to incorporate it in 
their payment system. The users of state cryptocurrencies would have digital 
wallets provided by licensed financial institutions. Since the state 
cryptocurrency does not necessarily replace cash money, rather it supplements 
it; it could be preferred by certain users. If the real intent of cryptocurrencies 
was indeed to enable conducting transactions faster and cheaper, state 
cryptocurrency would be the closet replica, without the downside of regulatory 
difficulty and cost involved in attempting to regulate decentralized 
cryptocurrencies.  But I don’t advocate for inflexibly fixed supply for state 
cryptocurrencies as the decision to increase or reduce money supply has to be 
revised according to the need for money supply in the society. Hence, the 
central bank in charge of the specific cryptocurrencies (for instance the 
European Central Bank and European National Central Banks) should 
determine the supply of the cryptocurrency. Software protocol imposed limit is 
arbitrary and unrealistic. For instance, it is almost impossible to purchase small 
amount of bitcoin because it is too expensive and one ends up paying excessive 
transactions fee to purchase a small amount.  
 Overall, implementing state cryptocurrency is possible but the challenge 
it faces should not be ignored. First and foremost, a state cryptocurrency might 
discourage users from using cryptocurrencies. Today, it is clear that the fast 
growth of cryptocurrencies is attributed to the fact that they are private and they 
operate in relatively under-regulated or unregulated spaces. 
 If the state takes cryptocurrencies over, it is not certain whether they 
would remain equally attractive. At the same time, whether a state 
cryptocurrency is implemented or not, regulations are going to be put in place 
sooner or later. Hence, if a state cryptocurrency can discourage users, so does 
tighter regulation. So it seems that any sort of regulation of cryptocurrencies is 
likely to curtail their attractiveness.  Originally the value of cryptocurrencies 
derived from their potential to serve as cheap method of payment. But as times 
passes, this raison d’etre has been abandoned as the transaction cost for the 
major cryptocurrencies is not that low and transfer of fund is not that fast. When 
this is coupled by regulations that are almost non-existent now in the EU, using 
cryptocurrencies would be even more expensive. So, was the cryptocurrency as 
money and payment system merely an attractive broken campaign promise?  It 
appears so.  
 A system of payment or currency whose main strength is lack of 
regulation cannot be considered sustainable at all. I strongly argue that both 
tighter regulation and state cryptocurrency have similar effect of discouraging 
the use of cryptocurrencies as both would simply target decentralization and 
anonymity, two of the most attractive features of cryptocurrencies. The best 
course of action would have been to simply define cryptocurrencies as securities 
as the new generation cryptocurrencies are used to evidence a stake in an 
enterprise. But the problem is that some are used as medium of exchange and 
there even emerging project campaigning to make cryptocurrencies mainstream 
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payments methods198. If this is indeed not done, a greater portion of the 
cryptocurrencies would simply not have values.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 It is almost a decade since bitcoin was first launched. Today there are 
dozens of decentralized peer-to-peer currencies. Despite the regulatory 
problems cryptocurrencies present, no meaningful step has been taken in the 
European Union. A closer examination of cryptocurrencies demonstrates that 
typical cryptocurrencies do not fit into the traditional legal rules governing 
payments services. Due to the technical deficiency of decentralized 
cryptocurrencies, reflected in unfettered decentralisation as their main feature, 
designing tailor-made payment service law for cryptocurrencies is impossible.  
 This article proposed two possible solutions to the problem. The first 
one is centralization of cryptocurrencies run by private entities coupled with a 
mandatory obligation to use intermediaries to transact in cryptocurrencies. This 
solution could potentially create private monopoly over payments systems 
conducted in cryptocurrencies. It also sustains the accountability deficit deeply 
embodied in decentralized cryptocurrencies. The second solution is creating 
state cryptocurrencies, run by the central bank. This solution is likely to 
discourage the use of cryptocurrencies, as it seems that cryptocurrencies have 
gained popularity because they are run by private entities, in a decentralized 
manner and anonymously.  But considering that tighter regulatory frameworks 
will inevitably be put in place with the effect of discouraging the use of 
cryptocurrencie for the prevalence of strong rule of law in the digital economy, 
the creation of state cryptocurrencies is the only realistic solution moving 
forward.  
 
 
                                                
198 See CRYPTO IMPROVEMENT FUND ICO, Business Plan, (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.cryptoimprovementfund.io/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CIF_BP_VF.pdf.  
